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In the name of parliamentary sovereignty:  
Conflict between the UK Government and the courts over judicial deference in 
the case of prisoner voting rights 
Helen Hardman1 
 
Abstract 
New archival evidence reveals how UK governments, since the 1970s,  have been concerned 
primarily with domestic courts encroaching on executive powers rather than those of the 
legislature. Alongside  the Human Rights Act 1998, a mechanism of judicial ‘deference’ to 
Parliament evolved to justify courts deferring to an act of Parliament, or to decisions of the 
legislature, or executive. As this paper argues, failure to clarify which of these three is at play 
has served as a helpful vehicle for Governments to convey the powerful narrative of courts 
using human rights frameworks to usurp the democratic powers of Parliament as legislature 
at times of conflict between the courts and the executive. In the prisoner voting debate, actors 
thus successfully invoked ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ to generate an emotive narrative that 
the European Court of Human Rights was usurping the powers of ‘Parliament’ when instead 
the Court, supported by the UK legal community,  was challenging the dangerous precedent 
set by the UK Divisional Court’s deference, in 2001, to the executive. Interview data 
demonstrates how the 2011 backbench parliamentary debate to flout Strasbourg’s judgments 
was largely manufactured to curtail the ECHR mechanism which empowers domestic courts 
to effectively hold the government to account. 
 
 
Introduction 
Much scholarly debate has focused on why the European Court’s prisoner voting 
judgments, Hirst No.2 (2004) and then Greens and M.T. (2010), resulted in unwarranted 
conflict between the UK Parliament, Government and the Strasbourg Court. These accounts 
have variously explained how the judgments have been misinterpreted or mischievously 
misrepresented (Bates, 2014; Ziegler, 2015; Mead, 2015; Bryan, 2013; McNulty, Watson and 
Philo, 2014) and why they were considered to be controversial (Lewis, 2006; Murray, 2011, 
2013; Foster, 2009; Briant, 2011; Dzehtsiarou, 2017). The present paper arose from a 
research project into how states comply with the European Convention on Human Rights 
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(ECHR) in the area of elections.2 The paper focuses exclusively on the narrative generated at 
the 2011 backbench debate: that the European Court directly challenged ‘the sovereignty of 
parliament’ in questioning whether the legislature had ever considered enfranchising 
prisoners. The overwhelming support of MPs at the 2011 backbench debate in favour of the 
motion to flout Strasbourg’s prisoner voting judgments was presented as conclusive evidence 
to the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers that Parliament had debated the issue 
democratically in accordance with the Court’s requirements and concluded that the law 
should not be substantively changed (Secretariat, 2011a). Yet interviewees have attested that 
the 2011 backbench debate and its outcome were largely manufactured, and done so to secure 
parliamentary support for Government policy, as this paper demonstrates. One explanation 
offered by an important stakeholder at interview has been overlooked: that the UK 
Government chose strategically not to implement the judgment in 2010 because it served as a 
way to whip up parliamentary and public support against rights-based judgments and human 
rights frameworks at the domestic level, which curtail the Government’s freedom to act. So, 
although ostensibly geared towards challenging the Strasbourg Court’s decisions, the 
strategic importance for the Conservatives in Government3 since 2010 in achieving this high-
profile display against Strasbourg was to challenge the rights-based frameworks that have 
empowered the domestic judiciary and pose a threat to executive power.  
 
The paper firstly presents new evidence from archival documents which attest a long-
held concern that the ECHR, once incorporated into UK law, would empower the domestic 
courts at the expense of the Government. Research conducted at the UK National Archives in 
Kew from 2015-2016 entailed consultation of around 300 declassified Government 
documents dating from 1952-1995, identified through catalogue keyword searches of 
‘ECHR’, ‘human rights’, ‘judicial review’ and ‘parliamentary sovereignty’. Data was 
collected from documents of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Home Office, the Prime 
Minister’s Office and the Treasury. 
 
 
The second section of the paper reviews how the UK courts’ mechanism of judicial 
deference developed around the Human Rights Act (HRA) and how legal scholars had 
identified faulty legal reasoning in the UK Divisional Court’s decision to defer to Parliament 
in 2001 over the issue of prisoner voting before Mr Hirst appealed this at Strasbourg. The UK 
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legal community’s concern that this was a misuse of deference was then echoed in the 
European Court’s 2004 judgment. 
 
The third section considers how the Labour Government responded to the Strasbourg 
judgments and how the Conservatives in opposition politicised the issue. Following the 
general election of 2010 and Strasbourg’s pilot judgment Greens and M.T. on prisoner 
voting, a bipartisan Conservative-Labour initiative to secure a vocal rejection by parliament 
of Strasbourg’s prisoner voting judgments was achieved in 2011, as discussed in the fourth 
section with reference to interview data. Interview participants comprised current and former 
parliamentarians, former judges, members of the Secretariat of the Council of Europe, former 
members of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and other stakeholders. 
Participants were selected through purposive sampling as those best-placed to offer insight 
into internal decision-making processes. 
 
The final sections provide evidence demonstrating broad support in Parliament and the 
UK courts for enfranchising some prisoners. Yet ultimately, in November 2017, the 
Government supplied the Committee of Ministers with an ‘administrative package’ 
(Secretariat, 2017), which falls very short of the scope of enfranchisement that was broadly 
endorsed in parliamentary consultations between 2006 and 2013 and as widely practiced 
elsewhere in Europe.  
 
 
1. Executive fears of the empowerment of UK domestic courts through the ECHR 
The domestic judiciary has increasingly acted as an effective check on the ‘elective 
dictatorship’4 in the UK since the 1970s, which has not been a welcome development to 
either Labour or Conservative governments. Under pressure from increasing domestic 
judicial review and the growing number of judgments from the European Court, governments 
periodically considered incorporating the ECHR into UK law. The alternative course of 
action which Conservative Governments considered on two occasions was to suspend the 
right to individual petition as the channel which brought these human rights violations to light 
within the ECHR framework. When this option was no longer available, after 1994, there was 
no alternative for the Government but to incorporate the ECHR, and the HRA was crafted to 
preserve ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ as the next section outlines. As discussions and 
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correspondence among ministers demonstrate, successive governments since the 1970s 
rejected incorporation primarily because of concerns that the courts would encroach on 
executive powers rather than those of the legislature.  
 
Under the Labour Government, incorporation, proposed by the Liberal Lord Wade in 
1977 and 1979 was supported by the Home Secretary and other cabinet ministers as a way to 
‘wash dirty linen at home rather than abroad.’5 Yet it was also interpreted by some Labour 
politicians at the time as a means for the traditionally right-wing conservative judiciary to 
encroach on left-wing politics (Oliver, 2013: 240), in that it ‘would encourage the courts to 
impede radical action by Labour governments.’6 As the Attorney General pointed out, 
European Court judgments against the UK reflected the inadequacy of the way in which 
individual rights were protected but that full ‘entrenchment…would remove a democratic 
safeguard against the possibility of an excessively anti-executive approach by the courts.’7 
The Home Office working group on the issue predicted that ‘the consequences would not be 
confined to the sphere of human rights’8 While others argued that ‘whatever we do the courts 
will be more interventionist’ because of the experience of membership to the European 
Community and the process of devolution within the UK. ‘It will be very difficult to control 
this, certainly by Governments with small parliamentary majorities.’9 The main concern, 
therefore, appears to have been the constraints that the UK courts could put on the executive, 
rather than concerns about power being taken from the parliament per se: ‘the courts would 
always be prejudiced against a radical Government.’10 Despite this, the Home Office 
requested the Government spokesman emphasise, when justifying to the public why it had 
decided to shelve the incorporation of the ECHR in 1977, that such a step would empower 
the courts at the expense of Parliament, granting judges the power to make political 
decisions.11  
 
Similar concerns were expressed by the Conservative Government of 1979-1983. By 
the 1980s the judiciary had become more interventionist, which prompted ministers’ concerns 
at the ‘expanding scope of judicial review and the difficulties faced by decision-makers in 
some areas in predicting how the courts will react.’12 As the Home Secretary expressed to the 
Prime Minister: ‘The mischief lies in the impact of judicial review cases on proper decision-
taking by the executive.’13 The Government sought ‘some curtailment of judicial 
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intervention… since it is bound to create increasing problems for the implementation of 
government policies.’14  
 
By 1985 the UK had been identified as the state with the largest number of violations of 
the ECHR15 and the law officers advised the Prime Minister that this was mainly because the 
UK had not incorporated the ECHR into domestic law.16 In 1985 and 1990 the Conservative 
Government explored alternative measures and considered not renewing the optional clauses 
of the ECHR: the right to individual petition and the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
which had given rise to the volume of European Court judgments and made these binding 
under international law. Yet politically, there was no real alternative but to renew these in 
198517 and in 1990, the decision was justified more explicitly with reference to the UK 
Government’s refusal to ratify the optional protocol of 1976 to the 1966 UN International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) which provided the equivalent right to 
individual petition within the UN human rights framework and which the UK Government 
was under increasing pressure to ratify. Failure to renew Articles 25 and 46 to the ECHR 
would make ‘untenable’ the UK’s stance that ratification of the ICCPR protocol was 
unnecessary.18 As the lesser of two evils, the UK Government opted for the right to 
individual petition at the European level instead. Moreover, by 1990 former Communist 
regimes of Central and Eastern Europe had begun applying for Council of Europe 
membership and all other Council of Europe members had renewed Articles 25 and 46.19 
‘The possibility that Eastern European countries might eventually become part of the 
Convention machinery would increase the pressures on the United Kingdom in this area’ and 
so the Home Office considered arguments in favour of renewal to be ‘overwhelming.’20 
Ultimately, the option of not renewing these provisions was no longer viable for any member 
state in 1994 when Protocol 11 to the ECHR opened for signature (Drzemczewski, 1999: 
224) because when it came into force in 1998, both the right to individual petition and 
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court became mandatory for all member states (Miller, 1998). 
 
Thus by the time that the Labour Party adopted the HRA as mainstream policy in their 
1996 election manifesto, incorporation of the Convention had become almost inevitable for 
any Government (McQuigg, 2014: 43). Incorporation was not widely supported in the Labour 
Party (Klug, 2012: 34) and was strategically geared towards securing Liberal Democrat 
support in the event that Labour failed to secure a majority at the 1997 general election 
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(McLean, 2009: 207). So, although the Labour governments of 1997-2010 then took 
measures to strengthen the human rights framework through the HRA, the Constitutional 
Reform Act (CRA) 2005 and the establishment of the Supreme Court, this step was 
‘surprising’ given that Labour had always been wary of granting judges powers to intervene 
in political decision-making (Oliver, 2013: 252; Ewing, 1999: 80; McQuigg, 2014: 40-41; 
Klug, 2012: 34). Once enacted in 1998, the focus of debate surrounding the HRA remained 
fixed on the question of how far the judiciary should be involved in political decision-
making. 
 
 
2. The courts’ deference and parliamentary sovereignty under the HRA 
Most of this debate has unhelpfully revolved around ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ and 
the notion of courts’ deference to Parliament which generally equates with ‘deference to 
legislation’ (Klug, 2003: 2) because ‘given the confusing nature of the (unwritten) British 
Constitution the executive and legislature are mostly impossible to disentangle’ (Klug, 2003: 
2). Whilst Parliament itself is not sovereign, Acts of Parliament made jointly by the executive 
and legislature are sovereign (Tomkins, 2009: 246). The following brief summary offers 
some of the salient points from these debates to contextualise the argument.  
 
All scholars generally concede that the HRA has strengthened the role of the courts in 
political decision-making, but they explain that it does so by involving all three branches of 
power in this process, thus increasing the accountability of both the executive and legislature 
(Woodhouse, 2002; Masterman, 2009; Young, 2009: 26) while preventing the rise of 
‘omnipotent courts’ (Nicol, 2002: 439). Parliamentary sovereignty is explicitly retained in the 
HRA because it does not provide judges with the power to strike down legislation but instead 
to declare an incompatibility between UK law and the ECHR (Harris, O’Boyle and Warbrick, 
2014: 27). So, ultimately it is for Parliament or the Government21 to decide whether they 
consequently amend the law, hence maintaining, in principle, the classic nineteenth century 
Diceyan account of the supremacy of Parliament (Elliott, 2007: 220-1). Yet, since the 1990s, 
this Diceyan model has been broadly considered to be outmoded (Dickson, 2007: 371-79; 
McLean, 2009: 27) and even a ‘fantasy … founded on deceit’ (Gearty, 2015).22 As early as 
the 1970s, there was an understanding in government circles that parliamentary sovereignty 
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was largely a myth: ‘it is idle to pretend that the UK as a nation or Parliament as an 
institution possesses unfettered sovereignty.’23 
 
The original purpose of articulating, constitutionally, that the executive obey the 
Parliament through the principle of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ was to emphasise the 
supremacy of Parliament and the limits of the monarchy’s discretionary powers over the 
prime minister and his Government: it was not intended to convey that the elected 
representative branches of the state were not subject to the law or the judiciary (Vile, 1998: 
155). Thus, some consider the principle of parliamentary sovereignty to be a judicial 
construct of the common law to protect the elected representative branches of power from 
interference by the monarch and that judges could choose the ‘nuclear option’ and assert the 
rule of law over parliamentary supremacy in the event of exceptional circumstances, such as 
Parliament attempting to abolish judicial review (Elliott, 2007: 233-34; Bogdanor, 2009: 158-
60; Street, 2013). Hence, as a theoretical construct, the Diceyan notion that Parliament may 
pass whatever legislation it chooses, even if that legislation is unconstitutional, appears to be 
a fundamental misreading of the principle (Vile, 1998: 155).  
 
At the same time, the boundaries between the remit of the elected branches of power 
and the judiciary have been preserved by a series of conventions and informal understandings 
(Judge, 2004: 692) and the informal nature of these constraints has left the UK judiciary 
unable to challenge the power balance status quo directly in the form of open, public dialogue 
(Nicol, 2006). This lack of clarity has therefore led to disagreement over the de facto powers 
of the domestic courts, with some arguing that the HRA and judicial review constituted ‘an 
unprecedented transfer of political power from the executive and legislature to the judiciary’ 
(Judge, 2004: 693) while others have considered it insufficient to prevent the executive’s 
violation of fundamental rights (Byrne and Weir, 2004: 454). The fuzzy nature of the 
domestic courts’ remit in this field has been compounded by the growth of the doctrine, 
which accompanied the HRA, of ‘due deference’: the principle that domestic courts should 
defer to the legislature or executive to decide rights-based issues in certain instances 
(Edwards, 2002: 860-862). Some argue that the legal community should never have conceded 
to this development (Feldman, 2015: 110).  
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Strictly speaking, ‘deference’ is already built into the HRA, in that it directly requires 
that the courts defer to the representative branches after they have reviewed the issue in 
question, and in the event that an incompatibility with Convention rights is declared, then it is 
up to the Government and Parliament to decide whether or not they will act on the judges’ 
finding. Thus some consider that any extra level of deference, afforded by the courts to the 
Parliament or Government, to be unnecessary (Gearty, 2004: 59; Klug, 2003), or instead an 
indication that judges have essentially disagreed with Parliament, but find it ‘politically 
inexpedient’ to find an incompatibility, and so ‘they will not so much defer as pretend that 
they think that [Parliament] was correct’ (Dyzenhaus, 2015: 444).  
 
This grey area has therefore led to many instances, especially in the early years of the 
HRA, when the UK courts were too deferential to Parliament in their decisions (Edwards, 
2002). One very notable instance when the degree of deference was particularly 
‘inappropriate’ (Lardy, 2002: 525; Edwards, 2002: 861) and ‘disappointing’ (Foster, 2001: 
174) was that of the UK Divisional Court’s judgment in 2001 on prisoner voting rights, 
which included John Hirst’s application (Lewis, 2006: 211).  
 
The Divisional Court noted the ‘apparent anomaly’ in the aim pursued for post-tariff 
prisoners in custody (Pearson, Martinez and Hirst, para 41) and more generally, the 
proportionality of the ban (para 40), which implicitly suggested this to be in breach of the 
ECHR. But, Lord Justice Kennedy nonetheless deferred to Parliament in deciding whether 
prisoners should be enfranchised and dismissed the applicants’ claims (Hirst No.2, paras 13-
14). Thus he failed to either justify the blanket ban for prisoners or declare an incompatibility 
with the Convention (Gearty, 2004: 58-59; Klug, 2003: 131). So, when Mr Hirst appealed 
this decision at Strasbourg, the European Court was ‘unlucky’ to be placed in the position of 
deciding the case in light of the faulty Divisional Court judgment (Gearty, 2015: 3). The 
European Court decided that the blanket ban, as articulated in the Representation of the 
People’s Act (RPA) 1983, was disproportionate (Hirst No.2 [GC], paras 48-50) and contested 
Lord Justice Kennedy’s assertion that the matter had been debated in Parliament (Hirst No.2 
[GC], para 51). Thus some scholars consider the Strasbourg judgments resulted from a 
failure on the part of the UK courts to intervene where appropriate to evaluate the quality of 
legislative debate on the issue (Lazarus and Simonsen, 2015: 388) or for being overly 
deferential to the legislature's decision (Lewis, 2006: 211), while others have interpreted the 
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judgments as the European Court primarily criticising the UK Parliament for failing to 
protect human rights (Murray, 2013: 523).  
 
Instead, this paper proposes that the Strasbourg Court’s Hirst No.2 judgment implicitly 
challenged the UK courts’ recourse to defer to the executive rather than the legislature under 
the HRA in this instance. Moreover, the judgment was issued at a point when relations 
between the UK courts and the Government had deteriorated to the level of ‘historically poor’ 
just after the Government had unsuccessfully tried between 2001 and 2003 to ‘get rid of 
judicial review’ because the UK courts had challenged a considerable number of Home 
Office asylum and immigration cases, which nearly ended in ‘constitutional crisis’ (Le Sueur, 
2004). As Richard Edwards (2002) argued, before the Strasbourg Court issued the Hirst No.2 
judgment, Lord Justice Kennedy had firstly deferred to the existing ban in the RPA 1983 that 
stemmed from and simply replicated the ban in the 1870 Forfeiture Act. Nor did this take into 
account the fact that between 1949 and 1969 prisoners serving sentences of less than a year in 
England, Wales and Northern Ireland and almost all prisoners in Scotland were eligible to 
vote (Murray 2013: 519-520; 2013b) with the exception of those convicted for electoral 
offences or those imprisoned for more than 12 months for treason.24 Because the Forfeiture 
Act predated the HRA by more than 100 years and the purpose of the ban had clearly 
changed since then, such deference was ‘highly tenuous to say the least’ (Edwards, 2002: 
862). The second and more substantive level of deference by the Divisional Court was to the 
Government minister’s judgement on the issue as expressed in Parliament during the passing 
of the 2000 law to amend the 1983 RPA (Lardy, 2002: 540-41).  
When the minister, George Howarth25, informed Parliament that the ban was to be 
retained, a Conservative MP questioned whether the European Court would consider this 
compatible with the ECHR (HC Deb 12.1.2000 Cols 342-3). A few months earlier, some 
members of a Home Office Select Committee had advocated prisoner voting and asked 
Howarth if his Working Group was considering this, but he declared that it was not (Select 
Committee, 10.9.1998). Yet Howarth’s response when he presented the Act to Parliament in 
2000, with a statement of compatibility from the Home Secretary, Jack Straw, (Hirst No.2, 
para 19), was that the issue had been ‘deliberated on and considered appropriately’ (HC Deb 
12.1.2000 Cols 342-3). Since the aim of the ban, as declared by the Government to justify its 
retention in 2000, must have differed from its original purpose in 1870 (Edwards, 2002: 862), 
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in effect, therefore, the Divisional Court was deferring to the Government’s wishes, as 
informed by a multi-party speaker’s conference in 1968 (Pearson, Martinez and Hirst, para 
7) and Howarth’s Working Group (para 40). But as law scholars noted before the Strasbourg 
judgment, the ‘careful evaluation’ of the matter by the legislature which Lord Justice 
Kennedy claimed to have taken place (Pearson, Martinez and Hirst, para 20) was not evident 
(Lardy, 2002: 540-541; Edwards, 2002: 862), as the Strasbourg Court later reiterated in its 
2004 judgment Hirst No.2.  
…the Court does not consider that a Contracting State may…justify restrictions on 
the right to vote which have not been the subject of considered debate in the 
legislature and which derive, essentially, from unquestioning and passive adherence 
to a historic tradition (Hirst No.2, para 41). … there is no evidence that the 
legislature in the United Kingdom has ever sought to weigh the competing interests 
or to assess the proportionality of the ban as it affects convicted prisoners (para 51).   
The Strasbourg judgment thus challenged the Divisional Court’s undue deference to the 
executive in this respect and the reasoning of the judgment reflected arguments proposed by 
UK law scholars and some parliamentarians as well as a range of NGOs. Thus as one 
stakeholder pointed out, while much of the hostility towards the prisoner voting judgments 
has been couched in the language of European judges overriding parliamentary will, it is 
really the threat to executive will that exercises the Government (Interview 2). The Strasbourg 
judgments on prisoners voting rights plugged directly into the hostility shared by both 
Conservative and Labour parties, while in Government, towards the notion that human rights 
set proper boundaries on executive power, especially in the area of criminal justice (Interview 
2).  
 
 
3. The UK Government’s response to the prisoner voting rights judgments 
The Labour Government appealed the judgment of Hirst No.2 and at the Grand 
Chamber hearing in 2005, the Prison Reform Trust and the AIRE Centre each intervened as 
third parties to argue in favour of the enfranchisement of prisoners (Hirst No.2 [GC], paras 
53-54), which also signalled to the European Court substantial NGO support in the UK for 
lifting the ban. The Court pointed out the ambiguity of the UK Divisional Court’s judgment 
insofar as it declared the matter was an issue for Parliament to decide and so did not evaluate 
the proportionality of the ban, yet had presented compelling evidence with reference to the 
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analogous Canadian case of Sauvé that the ban might not be considered proportionate (Hirst 
No.2 [GC] para 80). Thus the Grand Chamber affirmed the 2004 Chamber decision in finding 
a violation of the right to free and fair elections (Article 3 of Protocol 1). Following their 
unsuccessful appeal, the Government quickly set up a timetable to introduce the necessary 
legislative amendments, which suggests that there was certainly some Government will for 
implementation at that time, which was confirmed by a two-thirds majority vote in 
Parliament when the issue was raised at a commons debate on the 2006 Electoral 
Administration Act. At this debate, the Conservatives brought up the Hirst No.2 judgment 
and insisted on tabling a new clause in the act re-stating the blanket ban on voting for 
prisoners. The motion was defeated by 375 votes to 170 (HC Deb 11.1.2006 Cols 382-383) 
demonstrating considerable parliamentary support for lifting the blanket ban. But this also set 
a precedent among the Conservatives for a policy to re-state the blanket ban.  
 
In 2007, the Government acknowledged the ban to be a violation of the ECHR which 
was in turn confirmed by the Scottish Court of Session in the judgment of Smith v Scott 
(paras 8-9). By inference, therefore, the UK Government had admitted there to be an 
incompatibility with the HRA (Interview Easton; Interview 4). The Court of Session made a 
declaration of incompatibility with the HRA (Smith v Scott, para 56), and justified its 
authority to issue this under the Scotland Act (Smith v Scott, paras 34-37) (Interview 4). 
Because of these developments, stakeholders believed at the time that legislative amendments 
were in the pipeline (Interview Easton; Interview Kelly). Thus any strong objection, on the 
part of the Labour Government, to implementing the judgment was certainly not apparent. In 
April 2009, the Government launched the second consultation on the issue. The 
Conservatives objected and Dominic Grieve, as Shadow Secretary of State for Justice, 
announced to the press that the Government should provide an opportunity for Parliament to 
debate the issue and re-state the ban (Winnett and Whitehead, 2009). 
 
After the change in Government to a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition, the 
European Court’s Greens and M.T. judgment in November 2010 reiterated the decision in 
Hirst No.2. The Court noted that the new Government and Prime Minister had publicly 
acknowledged that this amounted to a violation (Greens and M.T., para 74) and had declared 
in November 2010 a legal obligation to amend the law (Greens and M.T., paras 42-43). 
Moreover, Parliament’s Joint Committee on Human Rights (JCHR), and the Equality and 
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Human Rights Commission had each expressed concern at the Government’s delay in 
implementing the Hirst judgment (Greens and M.T., para 75). Thus the evidence presented to 
the European Court suggested both willingness on the part of the UK Government and 
eagerness from Parliament to implement the Hirst judgment. In light of the large number of 
similar UK cases, the Court issued a pilot judgment (freezing all analogous cases and 
requiring more concrete remedial action by the UK Government) but did not award any 
financial compensation to the applicants (Greens and M.T., para 118). This was viewed by 
the legal representative for the applicants as derisory and a soft option which essentially let 
the UK Government off the hook (Interview Kelly). Similarly, the prevailing understanding 
at the Strasbourg Court, and more widely at the Council of Europe, was that the judgment 
was constructive and generous to the UK Government (Interview 1).  
 
The new Government’s willingness to comply was also apparent in a statement issued 
to Parliament in December 2010, which announced that prisoners serving a sentence of less 
than 4 years were to be given the vote through a forthcoming amendment to the RPA (HC 
Deb 20.12.2010 Cols 150WS-151WS). Yet in response a small group led by the Conservative 
MP Philip Hollobone held a Westminster Hall debate on the morning of 11 January 2011 to 
oppose the amendment. Hollobone began by agreeing with the Prime Minister’s view, that 
the idea of prisoners voting made him feel sick, and that he supported the Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve, who had advocated in 2009, that there be a parliamentary debate to allow 
MPs the opportunity to insist on retaining the blanket ban (HC Deb 11.1.2011, Cols 1-2WH). 
A variety of opinions were expressed and the tone of the debate was relatively moderate; as a 
Westminster Hall debate, the meeting was small and some present advocated another debate 
in opposition to prisoner enfranchisement, in the context of parliamentary sovereignty, which 
subsequently took place in the form of the 10 February 2011 backbench debate on the issue. 
 
Within a month the issue had suddenly blown out of all proportion. In Strasbourg, this 
reaction was unprecedented as the community at the Council of Europe did not expect the 
judgment would provoke such a response from the UK Government (Interview 1). Similarly, 
the Lord Chancellor and Justice Secretary, Kenneth Clarke, declared the day before the 
scheduled backbench debate that the Strasbourg judgment had hitherto never been considered 
controversial, and reiterated that the judgment would be implemented (Clarke, 2011). Since 
then, ‘the issue has been played out against a political and to some extent popular backlash 
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against the Convention system’ (Jacobs, White and Ovey, 2014: 62), beginning with the 
theatrical parliamentary debate in 2011.  
 
 
4. The Parliamentary backbench debate 
The backbench debate on the issue in February 2011 was designed, according to Jack 
Straw, to strengthen the hand of the Government in reporting back to Strasbourg that 
Parliament had met the Court’s requirements by holding a substantive debate on the issue but 
that Parliament had refused to change the law, thus making implementation of the judgments 
‘difficult or impossible.’ (HC Deb 10.2.2011 Col 504). The Prime Minister and other 
members of Government had already ‘quietly given a green light’ to the proponents because a 
rejection by Parliament would be ‘helpful’ (Daily Mail, 2011).  
 
The motion to flout the original Strasbourg judgment in Hirst No.2 (2004) was unusual 
in that it was bipartisan, brought by David Davis as the senior Conservative MP and Jack 
Straw as the senior Labour MP ‘united in their hostility to the European Court of Human 
Rights’ (Interview MacShane). Jack Straw had been directly challenged by John Hirst on this 
issue as Home Secretary at the time of the original Divisional Court judgment in 2001 and 
then again in 2004 as Foreign Secretary and thus the UK Government’s representative to the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. From 2007, as Secretary of State for Justice, he 
claimed that he had objected to the European Court telling ‘elected national parliaments what 
they could and could not do’ (Straw, 2012: 538)  
The premise on which he based his decision was that the European Court had ruled 
differently to the UK divisional court which had ‘declared the long-standing ban …was 
compatible with Convention rights under the [Human Rights] Act’ (Straw, 2012: 285). Yet, 
as others have pointed out, Lord Justice Kennedy had not explicitly declared the ban to be 
compatible with the Convention but had simply deferred to Parliament in ‘refusing to find 
any human rights violation’ (Gearty, 2015: 4-5). Nor had Lord Justice Kennedy sought to 
evaluate the proportionality of the ban, although in his judgment he presented compelling 
evidence that the ban could be considered disproportionate (Hirst No.2 [GC] para 80). 
Moreover, as later discussed in this paper, the public consultation of 2006 was  not 
‘inconclusive’ as Straw suggested, but instead demonstrated overall majority support for 
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enfranchising some prisoners, while the results of the 2009 consultation were never 
published. 
 
Using the device of the free vote through the backbench debate procedure gave the 
impression of freedom yet allowed the strong proponents of the motion to bring greater 
pressure to bear on the outcome which ‘nailed the attention’ on each MP’s individual 
decision on the issue, so that MPs could not say that they had been told to vote in a particular 
way by their party (Interview Williams). At the same time, it was quite clear what the views 
of the two senior Conservative and Labour proponents and the Prime Minister were. And 
although both Straw and Davis were parliamentary backbenchers at this time, arguably each 
represented their respective parties in their previous executive roles. The Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve, at the outset of his speech warned that although Conservative backbench 
turnout was very healthy, ‘the Opposition Benches seem to be, with a number of notable and 
eminent exceptions, rather bare. That might be a problem later in terms of the impact that this 
debate may have’ (HC Deb 10.2.2011 Col 510). The debate was dominated by Conservative 
backbenchers who delivered two-thirds of the speeches and made most of the ad hoc 
interventions26 and was viewed as, ‘the Government trying to get Parliament to provide 
backing for Government policy’ (Interview Bottomley) 
 
In the context of the perceived tide of public opinion as reflected in the popular press, 
giving a free vote on the issue essentially ensured that MPs voted the way the Government 
wanted without the Government appearing ‘oppressive in any sense’ (Interview Williams). 
Yet this alleged tide of public opinion was not reflected in letters from constituents, as MPs at 
interview claimed that they received little if any correspondence about the issue and so 
concluded it was not of much relevance to the public. The way in which the motion was 
brought strengthened the position of the proponents of the motion because it helped to 
construe the image of both ‘wicked prisoners and wicked Europeans at a time of anti-
European hysteria’ (Interview Williams) as a way to attack the European Court (Interview 
MacShane; Interview 3). Moreover, it was counterproductive in that it conflated the 
Strasbourg Court and Convention system with the principle of prisoner voting (Interview 
Bottomley) resulting in a ‘perfect storm’ (Murray, 2013) The conditions under which the 
debate took place resulted in only 22 votes against the motion to flout the Strasbourg 
judgment and 234 in favour. MPs were not surprised at this, and as one explained there was a 
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‘campaign’ beforehand during which MPs committed to vote in favour of the motion 
irrespective of the arguments proposed during the debate (Interview Bottomley). The reason 
why so few MPs were against the motion was ‘because they either hadn’t thought about it, or 
they weren’t interested or they didn’t dare’ (Interview Bottomley).  
 
Others suggested that scheduling the debate on a Thursday afternoon, the day of the 
week when MPs would be returning to their constituencies, depressed turnout especially 
among those travelling further from Westminster. The overall turnout was 54%. Since 
Conservative backbench constituencies were located, on average, much closer to 
Westminster27 this may have facilitated greater Conservative turnout, which was 72%.28 
Turnout for Labour and Liberal Democrat backbenchers was considerably lower at 37%29 and 
34%30 respectively. Yet distance did not altogether explain turnout31 nor was turnout 
consistently higher from those regions closer to Westminster.32  
 
What may have brought considerable pressure to bear on how some MPs voted was that 
these events were significantly overshadowed by the prosecution and conviction of MPs in 
the wake of the expenses scandal. Both news stories of prisoner voting and the expenses 
scandal were covered in the mainstream media around the January and February debates of 
2011 and although these stories were almost invariably covered as separate items they 
frequently appeared in the same newspaper issues or broadcasts.  
 
The issues had been briefly linked in parliamentary debate on 2 November 2010 in the 
question of whether prisoners would be allowed to vote at the forthcoming Alternative Vote 
referendum. The Deputy Prime Minister replied that rectifying fundamental injustices in how 
people elect their MPs promised to undo the damage of the parliamentary expenses scandal 
(HC Deb 2.11.10 Col 862). But the public had more clearly linked the two stories in social 
media tweets, joking about whether MPs in prison would get the vote. Similar tweets33 were 
posted in response to the BBC television programme Question Time34 on 4 November 2010 
following that evening’s episode which featured the issue of prisoner voting discussed by a 
panel including Jack Straw and David Davis (Mentornmedia, 2011).  
 
A few days later, the UK Supreme Court ruled out the use of parliamentary privilege for 
the first MPs to be prosecuted in R v Chaytor and others (10 November 2010) which attracted 
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media coverage around the same time that the European Court issued the Greens and M.T. 
judgment. The first to be sentenced to prison was the Labour MP David Chaytor on 7 January 
2011. The next was the Labour MP Eric Illsley who was convicted on the morning of the 
Westminster Hall debate about the issue of prisoner voting on 11 January and who was then 
sentenced on the day of the subsequent backbench debate, 10 February. The Labour MP Jim 
Devine was also additionally convicted on the morning of 10 February and news items were 
posted on the Conservative Party home page to announce these developments at 12.15, just 5 
minutes before the debate began, and at 4.45 pm towards the end of the debate.35Although 
these events could be considered coincidental, the probability that these particular hearings 
would take place on both of these days is extremely low,36 which could suggest that they 
were purposely timed to coincide.37  
 
Backbench MPs had expressed concern that the system of investigation and prosecution 
was neither systematic nor fair (HC Deb 2.12.2010 Cols 1001-1005) and some felt that 
decisions to prosecute were relatively arbitrary, which gave the impression that party 
leaderships were selecting scapegoats to satisfy public outrage (Hattenstone, 2012). If 
malpractices in claiming expenses had been encouraged and institutionalised since the 1960s 
to compensate for the Government’s failure to raise parliamentarians’ salaries (MacShane, 
2014: 44-48; Hattenstone, 2012) then understandably these practices had come to be viewed 
as an entitlement long before they emerged in the press as a scandal (Kelso, 2009: 330-32; 
Allen, 2011: 229-30).  
 
MPs had also expressed frustration that press coverage regarding expenses seemed to be 
timed to coincide with relevant scheduled debates, suggesting details were being purposely 
leaked by the authorities tasked within Parliament to investigate MPs’ expenses (HC Deb 
2.12.2010 Col 1029). The issue of expenses remained prominent in the media and in mid-
January fresh police investigations were initiated by ‘a disgruntled MP’ who supplied 
evidence that a further 6 unnamed MPs had claimed expenses fraudulently (Carlin, 2011).38 
Because some MPs had first learnt from the press that they were under investigation (HC Deb 
2.12.2010 Col 1002), this news story may have made some feel vulnerable, regardless of their 
conduct, and perhaps more inclined, or even under some pressure, to vote in tune with their 
senior party leaders at the February debate. If so, then Labour backbenchers were more 
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vulnerable to this pressure because three-quarters of them had been elected before the 
expenses scandal broke in contrast to only one third of Conservative backbenchers.  
 
The Government ultimately decided when the backbench debate was to be scheduled 
(BBC News, 18.1.2011) which one stakeholder believed was purposely timed to coincide 
with the key moments of the expenses trials (Interview 6) as a way to exploit the trauma MPs 
were experiencing to mobilise support for the motion: 
Everyone was treated by the popular press as a criminal or a potential criminal, and 
certainly I know that a number of MPs’ views were influenced by the fact that if they 
were sympathetic in any way to human rights or voting for prisoners then they’d be 
targeted by the popular press. And right alongside that was their expenses claims. So, I 
don’t think members of Parliament expressed their real views (Interview 6).  
Other MPs may have felt pressure to demonstrate a tough line against criminals, generally, 
following the media focus on alleged corruption and criminality within Parliament itself,39 
while another participant suggested anticipated political advancement explained why some 
MPs supported the motion (Interview 7). 
  
 
5. Consultations and parliamentary support for prisoner enfranchisement  
The issue of implementing the prisoner voting judgments remained under the 
supervision of the Committee of Ministers In 2013 the Government set up a parliamentary 
select committee to investigate the issue once more and as with the consultation of 2006, the 
overwhelming majority of respondents expressed the opinion that the ban should be lifted. 
Yet Government communications failed to indicate the positive nature of the outcome 
(Secretariat, 2013; 2014) At the 2006 consultation only 25% of all respondents favoured 
maintaining the ban (Ministry of Justice 2009: 14) while 47% favoured all prisoners being 
given the vote (Secretariat, 2010a). The outcome to the 2006 consultation was published in 
2009  (Horne and White, 2015). But the results of the second stage of the consultation in 
2009 were apparently never published (Secretariat, 2010b). The 2013 select committee was 
tasked with examining a draft bill which provided three options: to maintain the status quo or 
enfranchise prisoners serving sentences of six months or less, or those sentenced to less than 
four years (Ministry of Justice, 2012:3). At the outset, the majority of the committee was 
opposed to amending the law and some were apparently quite intransigent (Interview Jacobs; 
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Interview Easton). But in conclusion, the select committee recommended that prisoners 
serving a sentence of 12 months or less  should be enfranchised (HL, HC, Joint Committee, 
2013)). The fact that many of these individuals changed their minds in the light of evidence 
presented suggests Parliament, more broadly would be more receptive to changing the law 
than the backbench debate indicates. Yet, in the wake of the December 2013 inquiry, the 
Government did not present a bill to Parliament in the form recommended, which indicates 
little Government concern for parliamentary sovereignty where select committees are 
specifically tasked to investigate issues on behalf of Parliament and hold the Government to 
account (Bradley and Ewing, 2011: 210-211; House of Commons, 2015: 3) 
 
Instead, in keeping with Conservative party policy40 the Conservative MP Christopher 
Chope, a previous UK delegate to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
(PACE), on two occasions tabled a bill in 2014 and 2015 to restate that convicted prisoners 
remain ineligible to vote.41 Although the UK Government emphasised that Chope’s bills were 
not ‘Government sponsored’ nonetheless they were presented as evidence to the Committee 
of Ministers of the overwhelming parliamentary hostility to prisoner voting (Secretariat, 
2015a).  One interviewee expressed the view that until the change in Government in 2010, 
long-serving Conservative MPs in PACE, such as Mr Chope, had always acted courteously 
and constructively, yet had suddenly become unhelpful and combative after the Greens and 
M.T. judgment (Interview 5). On both occasions, Chope’s bill was prorogued which again 
suggests Parliament’s unwillingness to re-state the ban. 
 
In the next report to the Committee of Ministers, the new UK Minister for Human 
Rights, Dominic Raab, reiterated that hostility within Parliament was unlikely to change in 
the foreseeable future and this prevented the Government from lifting the ban (Secretariat, 
2016). As the third proponent of the motion to flout Strasbourg judgments at the 2011 
backbench debate, Raab had played a prominent role in winding up the debate with his own 
controversial speech which declared that judgments issued to the UK since 1978 amounted to 
a ‘serious abuse of power’ by the Court (HC Deb 10.2.2011 Col 583). 
 
 
6. The position of the UK courts since 2013 
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When the issue reappeared before the UK Supreme Court in 2013, in the context of 
prisoner voting rights at European Parliament elections, the Court acted cautiously and 
rejected the cases but refused to fundamentally contest the European Court’s decision in Hirst 
as the Attorney General requested (Tickell, 2014:291). The Supreme Court thus pre-empted a 
renewed and potentially more persuasive attempt by the Attorney General to contest the 
judgments again in Strasbourg (Tickell, 2014: 291). But the Court refused to refer the case 
under EU law to the CJEU (Chester and McGeoch, para 84) which was surprising given the 
significant proportion of the judgment ‘devoted to the hypothetical case under EU law’ 
(Sheridan, 2013). According to one interviewee, the presence of the Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve, and other members of Parliament at the hearing was unusual, and this 
indicated to the Court the political importance of the case (Interview 4).     
 
Government communications to the Committee of Ministers had requested deferral of 
the deadline for implementation to await the outcome of related prisoner voting judgments in 
the cases of Scoppola v Italy (No.3) (Secretariat, 2011b), in which the Attorney General, 
Dominic Grieve had intervened unsuccessfully, and then Thierry Delvigne v Commune de 
Lesparre-Medoc (Secretariat, 2015) In October 2015 the issue reappeared, this time before 
the Luxembourg Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Delvigne case. 
Although the CJEU ruling on prisoner voting rights did not find a violation of Thierry 
Delvigne’s right to vote, the judgment confirmed that the right to vote in European 
Parliament elections was covered under Article 39(2) of the EU Charter, the equivalent right 
to Article 3 of Protocol 1 of the ECHR (HL EU Committee 2016, paras 103-4). Thus, in the 
same way that the Strasbourg Court had found UK law to be incompatible with the ECHR in 
Hirst No.2, the CJEU could theoretically find the UK blanket ban on prisoner voting unlawful 
under the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Simpson 2015). Following Delvigne, the 
House of Lords European Union Committee conducted an inquiry between October 2015 and 
February 2016 into the implications of the repeal of the HRA and withdrawal from the ECHR 
on the UK’s obligations under the EU. The Committee concluded on the basis of expert 
evidence that the judgment in Delvigne would most likely generate more prisoner voting 
cases analogous to Chester and McGeoch (HL EU Committee 2016, para 108) and more 
generally human rights litigation in national courts under the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights (HL EU Committee 2016, para 80). The report focused in particular on the case of 
prisoner voting rights in the UK and the Committee suggested that the Supreme Court would 
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in future refer such cases to the CJEU, resulting in EU litigation (HL EU Committee 2016, 
paras 108; 112-113). The Committee’s suggestion (albeit prior to the 2016 EU referendum) 
that the UK domestic courts would come to rely on the EU Charter for human rights further 
demonstrates that it is the action and decisions of domestic courts that challenge the political 
branches of power.  
 
 
Conclusions 
Having failed to secure the approval of the Parliamentary Committee to flout the 
Strasbourg judgments on prisoner voting in 2013,  the Government quickly shifted focus 
from Strasbourg to the UK judiciary. The Government met with some resistance from the 
Supreme Court in response to the renewed threats to withdraw the UK from the ECHR: since 
2014 the Supreme Court has begun explicitly relying on the use of the common law in rights-
based judgments to send a clear signal to the Government that it does not need to invoke the 
HRA or ECHR to justify such decisions (Knight and Cross; Clayton; Stephenson; Ferreira, 
2015). This innovation communicates to the Government that repealing the HRA or 
withdrawal from the ECHR wouldnot prevent judges making rights-based decisions.  
 
In retaliation, the Government curtailed the powers of UK courts to protect citizens’ 
rights in the areas of access to justice (Interview Jacobs; Rozenberg; McMahon,; Hyde, ; 
Bano, ; Eve, 2015)42 and judicial review (HL HC JCHR 2014: 17; 22-27; Travis; Patrick, 
2014) through the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015.43 Although this act circumscribed 
the courts’ powers of judicial review, key legal NGOs successfully lobbied Parliament to 
mitigate some of the chilling effects of the law (BIICL, 2015: foreword). And, in response, 
the Government shifted its sights to this source of resistance in 2015 to target NGOs as a 
channel for successful intervention in rights-based cases as achieved, for example, by the 
AIRE Centre and the Prison Reform Trust in the Hirst No.2 [GC] case.44 At the 2011 
backbench debate on prisoner voting, one MP received considerable support when she urged 
the Attorney General to look into whether public and charitable funding should continue to be 
made available to organisations such as the AIRE Centre (HC Deb 10.2.2011 Cols 558-9). 
The Government subsequently introduced an anti-lobbying clause, designed to prevent 
charities, NGOs and other public sector grant holders from using public funds to lobby 
Parliament with advice that challenges Government policy (Interview 4) but after widespread 
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opposition this was repealed in December 2016 (Weaver and Butler, 2016). Yet, under the 
Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, court charges may  now be imposed on such 
interveners in the UK courts if they ‘behave unreasonably’ or fail to be of ‘significant 
assistance to the court’ (James, 2015). Because applicants must first exhaust domestic 
remedies before filing an application at the European Court, NGOs’ capacity to lodge such 
applications will be hampered if the costs become too prohibitive for them to begin these 
proceedings at the domestic level. Thus the risk of fines will have a chilling effect on human 
rights NGOs’ continuing advocacy in the UK (BIICL, 2015: iii-iv).  
 
Returning to the issue of parliamentary sovereignty, since 2016 the UK higher courts 
became directly embroiled in checking executive powers vis-à-vis the Parliament. The 
Government’s refusal in 2016 to allow Parliament’s involvement in the process of triggering 
Article 50 TEU, and the terms by which the UK withdraws from the EU, demonstrates, once 
again, executive disregard for the powers of the legislature. As the High Court articulated in 
their 2016 judgment of Miller and Santos (which challenged the Government’s constitutional 
power to trigger Article 50 without consulting Parliament) under the Royal Prerogative, the 
scope of the executive to act independently of the Parliament is constitutionally limited 
(Miller and Santos, 2016, paras 24-25) and this scope is determined by the courts (Maer and 
Gay, 2009:3-4). As the Court made clear to the Government, no branch of the executive may, 
without parliamentary consent, amend or repeal a law (Miller and Santos, 2016: para 29) 
because it ‘cannot without the intervention of Parliament confer rights on individuals or 
deprive individuals of rights’ (Miller and Santos, 2016: para 32; Bradley and Ewing, 
2011:254;258-59). Although the Government appealed the judgment, the Supreme Court 
upheld the High Court’s decision.45 Thus, the UK courts have clarified to the Government the 
limits of executive power in deciding rights-based issues. More importantly, these UK court 
judgments reiterate the importance of the role of the legislature in this context, as was also 
emphasised in the Strasbourg judgment Hirst No 2 (para 51).  
 
Finally, the issue of prisoner voting in the UK was apparently resolved in December 
2017 when the Council of Europe accepted the UK Government’s administrative package 
(Committee of Ministers, 2017) to enfranchise prisoners that have been released on 
temporary licence, estimated to number around 100 people (HC Deb 21.12.17 Col 1277) of a 
prison population of 92,500 (Sturge, 2018). Improving conditions in prisons, which are 
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overcrowded and unsafe (Prisons and Probation Ombudsman, 2018), is likely to be a higher 
priority for prisoners than securing voting rights. But this outcome is nonetheless 
disappointing and indicates the Government’s disregard for the ECHR mechanism. 
 
What remains less clear, however, is the means by which the outcome of the 2011 
backbench debate on prisoner voting was reached. If manufactured, as interviews suggest, 
then this was a cynical abuse of Parliament’s sovereignty by the Government in a way which 
political scientists might characterise the decision-making processes of authoritarian regimes. 
In any event, the backbench debate demonstrates both the vital importance of the courts in 
adjudicating rights-based issues as well as the dangers of judicial deference to Parliament in 
an ‘elective dictatorship.’ 
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Notes 
                                                          
1 Thanks are owed to the journal editors, two anonymous reviewers and Professor Jane 
Duckett, University of Glasgow, for their help in revising this article.  
2 From the author’s interviews conducted 2012-2017, forthcoming in H. Hardman, 
Complying with the ECHR: the role of public debate in electoral reform, Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar 
3 In coalition with the Liberal Democrat Party 2010-2015 
4 Term used to advocate incorporation of the ECHR into UK law by both Conservatives 
(Lord Hailsham) and Labour (John Smith) while in opposition in 1978 and 1992 (Klug, 
2012:32;34) 
5 Letter, Anthony Crosland to Prime Minister [August, 1976], PREM 16/1294 
6 Minute, 21.12.1976 to Prime Minister on Cabinet meeting of 10.6.1976, PREM 16/1294 
7 Minute, Samuel Silkin to Prime Minister, 13.12.1976, PREM 16/1294 
8 Report, Working Group on Human Rights, [1976], PREM 16/1294 
9 Minute, Secretary of State for Trade to Cabinet and Prime Minister, 7.1.1977, FCO 33/3312 
10 Letter, Minister of Defence to Prime Minister, 4.1.1977, FCO 33/3312 
11 Home Office memorandum to Cabinet, 21.1.1977, FCO 33/3312 
12 Minute, Law Officers to Prime Minister, 22.7.1987, PREM 19/2295 
13 Letter, Douglas Hurd to Prime Minister, 6.4.1987, PREM 19/2295 
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14 Letter, Shirley Stagg to Nigel Wicks, 30.3.1987, PREM 19/2295 
15 ‘Human Rights’, Home Secretary’s minutes 13.5.1985; 10.7.1985, PREM 19/1756 
16 Ibid 
17 Letter, Leon Brittan to Geoffrey Howe, 29.7.1985, PREM 19/1756 
18 Letter 5.11.1990, HO 273/28 
19 Ibid 
20 Discussion paper, April 1990, HO 273/28.  
21 Under section 10 of the HRA the Government may take remedial action without consulting 
Parliament, and for example, amend legislation as they consider necessary to remove the 
incompatibility (HRA, 10(2); Schedule 2(2))   
22 MJE Fretwell, memorandum to Mr Goulding on the Lord President’s seminar on 
Parliamentary Sovereignty and the EEC, 17.12.1974, FCO 30/2455 
23 MJE Fretwell, 17.12.1974 memorandum to Mr Goulding on the Lord President’s seminar 
on Parliamentary Sovereignty and the EEC, FCO 30/2455 
24 Annex 3: Scotland, FCO 41/91 UK implementation of ECHR 1967-1968 
25 Chairing the Home Office Working Group 
26 28/42 speeches and 19/26 interventions by other MPs. 
27 Conservative: 180 km; Labour: 331 km; Liberal Democrat: 376 km. Distances calculated 
using https://distancecalculator.globefeed.com/UK_Distance_Calculator.asp 
28 voting in favour; one MP voting against 
29 33% in favour; 4% against. 
30 10% in favour; 24% against 
31 The average distance for those that voted: Conservatives: 171 km; Labour: 326  km; 
Liberal Democrat: 249 km. So, comparing with averages cited in note 29, distance was only 
significantly less for Liberal Democrats that voted.  
32 Labour turnout: North East:55%; London:52%; East Midlands:38%; West Midlands:37%; 
Yorkshire Humber:35%; Scotland:34%; Wales:33%; South West:33%; North West:28%; 
South East:0% East of England:0%. Conservative turnout: West Midlands:80%; South 
West:77%; East of England:76%; East Midlands:76%; London:75%; South East:72%; 
Yorkshire Humber:71%; North West:53%; Wales:50%; North East:50% 
33 The search entailed tweets #bbcqt @bbcquestiontime posted on 4.11.2010 
34 http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b006t1q9 
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35 See: http://www.conservativehome.com/frontpage/2011/02/newslinks-for-thursday-11th-
february-2011.html  
36 Between 7.1.2011 and 23.12.2013 only 5 MPs were convicted and given prison sentences. 
37 There was no guarantee the jury at Jim Devine’s trial would reach a guilty verdict, nor 
would do so quickly, but this might have been anticipated because Devine’s was reported 
beforehand as a ‘very straightforward’ case of false accounting (Davies; PA; Seamark, 2011) 
and juries generally deliberate less over alleged economic crimes (Meitl, Piquero and 
Piquero, 2017). 
38 ‘One ex-Labour Cabinet Minister, two Labour MPs, one Liberal Democrat and two Tories’ 
(Carlin, 2011) 
39 Whether the issue of expenses was a factor in how they voted was not raised at interview 
with serving MPs because of ethical considerations. 
40 The Conservative Party pledged in a policy document 2014 ‘Protecting human rights in the 
UK’ to present Strasbourg with an ultimatum that European Court judgments were to be 
advisory only, amounting to withdrawal from the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court 
(Article 46), in breach of protocol 11 and ultimately withdrawal from the ECHR. The 
Conservative Party manifesto (2015:60) declared ‘we have stopped prisoners from having the 
right to vote’ and maintained the Government would ‘scrap the HRA’. 
41 Private Members’ Bill, sponsored by Christopher Chope, Convicted prisoners voting bill 
2014-2015; 2015-2016 
42 The Parliament’s Justice Committee expressed similar misgivings (HC Justice Committee, 
2015) so the Government repealed it. (BBC, 2015)  
43 HC Bill 192 
44 Since 1994 when NGOs and groups of individuals were granted powers to file applications 
at the European Court, NGOs have acquired a  more prominent role in the process of the  
Court’s adjudication which has generated greater human rights advocacy in the UK and 
elsewhere (Cichowski, 2011). 
45 requiring an Act of Parliament to trigger Article 50 TEU but no necessary consultation 
with the devolved assemblies (Miller and another) 
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